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Abstract. This paper studies the relationship between Argumentation Logic (AL), a
recently defined logic based on the study of argumentation in AI, and classical Propo-
sitional Logic (PL). In particular, it shows that AL and PL are logically equivalent in
that they have the same entailment relation from any given classically consistent theory.
This equivalence follows from a correspondence between the non-acceptability of (argu-
ments for) sentences in AL and Natural Deduction (ND) proofs of the complement of
these sentences. The proof of this equivalence uses a restricted form of ND proofs, where
hypotheses in the application of the Reductio of Absurdum inference rule are required to
be “relevant” to the absurdity derived in the rule. The paper also discusses how the argu-
mentative re-interpretation of PL could help control the application of ex-falso quodlibet
in the presence of inconsistencies.
Keywords: Argumentation, Propositional logic, Natural deduction, Reductio ad Absur-
dum.
1. Introduction
Argumentation and logic have traditionally been considered as closely
related, but nonetheless formally diﬀerent. As early as in the work of Aris-
totle1, who separates “dialectic argument” from “syllogism”, argumentative
reasoning has been distinguished from the demonstrative reasoning of deduc-
tion in logic. This paper studies the link between the proof theoretic view
of Natural Deduction (ND) [11,12,20] for classical Propositional Logic (PL)
and the recently proposed Argumentation Logic (AL) [19], and proves that
the two are equivalent in the case of classically consistent PL theories.
Artiﬁcial Intelligence falls squarely within the traditional view of argu-
mentation in AI (e.g. see [2,23] for overviews), where conﬂicts are captured
via attacks, and conﬂicts are handled by defending against all attacking
arguments. Our equivalence between PL and AL reconciles the aforemen-
tioned diﬀerences between classical logic and argumentation, by showing
that ND proofs, including RA, can be given an argumentative reading and
1Topics I (100a25–30), Prior Analytics I (24a22–24b12).
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amount to a dialectical process. We will discuss how our equivalence between
PL and AL could then pave the way towards a form of paraconsistent rea-
soning in PL, controlling the application of the ex-falso quodlibet principle
from inconsistent (and thus conﬂicting) information.
In AL, (sets of) propositional formulae are treated as arguments and
entailment is deﬁned through a notion of acceptability of arguments adapted
from argumentation in Artiﬁcial Intelligence [8,14,15,18]. Informally, con-
clusions of AL are sentences supported by acceptable arguments and for
which no acceptable argument exists supporting the contrary position, i.e.
the negation of the sentences. The acceptability of sentences is deﬁned in
terms of notions of attack and defence between arguments and follows the
natural dialectic prescription of argumentation, that for an argument to
be deemed acceptable, for any attacking argument against it, there must
exist an acceptable defending argument against the attacking argument.
In AL, attack between arguments is deﬁned in terms of a notion of direct
derivation (resulting from applying ND without the Reductio ad Absurdum
(RA)/Negation Introduction inference rule). Sets of propositional formulae
characterise direct derivations from them, and the two views of arguments
as sets of formulae and as direct derivations coincide. Informally, an argu-
ment attacks another if the two, together, directly derive an inconsistency.
Then, defence is deﬁned as a restricted form of attack, originating from the
defending argument undermining, by taking the complementary position, a
sentence in the argument being defended against.
To prove the desired result of equivalence between AL and PL, we con-
sider a restricted form of ND, motivated by the argumentative view. This
restricted form of ND limits the application of RA so that, informally, in any
application of this inference rule, the direct derivation of the contradiction
necessarily requires the hypothesis posited at the start of the application of
RA. We call ND derivations where the RA rule is so restricted as fulﬁlling the
Genuine Absurdity Property (GAP). GAP can be seen as a relevance prop-
erty needed for arguments to form “proper” dialectical counter-arguments.
We show that AL and PL are logically equivalent by showing a corre-
spondence between (non)-acceptability of formulae in AL and derivations in
the restricted GAP-fulﬁlling ND. The equivalence result between AL and
PL then follows from a central technical lemma showing that in fact the
restricted form of ND is not restrictive in the conclusions derived when the
given theory of premises is classically consistent, in that any ND proof can
be mapped onto (at least) one corresponding GAP-fulﬁlling ND proof.
AL rests on separating RA from the other ND inference rules. Indeed,
whereas the latter rules provide the building blocks for “direct arguments”,
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RA does not, by operating in two steps: ﬁrstly it recognises that the posited
hypothesis is inconsistent and secondly it derives the complement of the
hypothesis. In AL, rather than using RA with a given hypothesis to obtain
an “indirect argument” for the complement of the hypothesis, the hypothesis
is recognised as (dialectically) non-acceptable: in the simplest case, when the
hypothesis leads to inconsistency by a direct derivation (without any nested
uses of RA), then it is self-attacking and hence a non-acceptable argument;
in more complex cases (with nested uses of RA) the posited hypotheses
can only be eventually defended by arguments which are self-attacking and
again, since the defending arguments are non-acceptable, so is the posited
hypothesis. Non-acceptability of the hypothesis in turn implies that it is not
AL-entailed but not that its complement is AL-entailed. Indeed, the com-
plement of the hypothesis could also be non-acceptable if the given theory
is classically inconsistent.
The main technical result of the paper gives, in the case of classically
consistent theories, equivalence between non-acceptability of arguments {φ}
and full ND derivations (possibly using RA) of ¬φ, thus showing that AL
can recover all logical consequences of PL, including those requiring indirect
proofs using RA. However, in the case of classically inconsistent theories, we
show that AL does not behave like PL, by avoiding trivialisation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give
some preliminary deﬁnitions. In Section 3 we provide a motivating illustra-
tion of AL (formally given in Section 4) and GAP and the restricted form
of ND we introduce (formally given in Section 5). In Section 6 we give the
main technical result of equivalence between AL and PL. In Section 7 we
discuss some implications of our results, notably in the case of inconsistent
theories. Section 8 discusses related work and Section 9 concludes with a
summary and a brief discussion of future work.
2. Preliminaries
Let L be a Propositional Logic (PL) language obtained from a given set of
atoms but using only the ¬ and ∧ connectives, without loss of generality (as
every theory in PL can be equivalently formulated using only these connec-
tives). Throughout the paper, theories and sentences will always be theories
and sentences in PL, with respect to L. We assume that L contains the
special sentence ⊥, informally amounting to inconsistency. Given a sentence
φ from L, the complement φ of φ is ψ if φ = ¬ψ and ¬φ otherwise.
We use the following Natural Deduction (ND) rules, for any φ, ψ ∈ L:
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∧I : φ, ψ
φ ∧ ψ ∧E :
φ ∧ ψ
φ
∧E : φ ∧ ψ
ψ
DN:
¬¬φ
φ
¬E: φ,¬φ⊥ RA1 :
φ . . .⊥
¬φ RA2 :
¬φ . . .⊥
φ
RA1 is normally referred to as intuitionistic Reductio ad Absurdum (RA)
and RA2 as classical RA. We will often refer to the use of any of RA1 and
RA2 simply as RA.2
Derivations result from applying these ND rules in sequence.3 We refer
to the premise φ . . .⊥ or ¬φ . . .⊥ of an application of RA as a sub-
derivation, and to φ or ¬φ, respectively, as the hypothesis of the sub-
derivation. Note that, in the fragment of PL we consider, all sub-derivations
of a derivation result from applications of RA. Also, sub-derivations may
have sub-derivations in turn. We refer to each occurrence of the hypothesis
of d = φ . . .⊥ or d = ¬φ . . .⊥ in a sub-derivation of d as a copy of the
hypothesis.
The following example illustrates the use of the ND rules above to give
derivations and sub-derivations.
Example 1. Let T = {¬(¬α ∧ β),¬(γ ∧ ¬β), γ ∧ δ}. The following is a
derivation of α from T :4
1 ¬α hypothesis
2 β hypothesis
3 c(¬α) copy of ¬α
4 ¬α ∧ β ∧I
5 ¬(¬α ∧ β) from T
6 ⊥ ¬E
7 ¬β RA1
8 γ ∧ δ from T
9 γ ∧E
10 γ ∧ ¬β ∧I
11 ¬(γ ∧ ¬β) from T
12 ⊥ ¬E
13 α RA2
2Note that using both RA1 and RA2 is redundant, due to the inclusion amongst the
inference rules of the Double Negation (DN) rule. Moreover, using DN is redundant given
the RA2 and ¬Elimination (¬E) rules. We use this redundant set of rules nonetheless to
simplify the presentation of our approach.
3Note that we have opted for a Fitch-style notation for derivations, as this makes it
easier to link with the argumentation semantics of AL.
4We adopt the convention to write a copy of a hypothesis φ in a sub-derivation as c(φ).
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Steps 1–12 form a sub-derivation of this derivation, and steps 2–6 are a
sub-derivation of this sub-derivation.
The following example gives a further illustration showing, in particular,
that ex-falso quodlibet holds using the ND rules given above.
Example 2. Let T = {¬(α∧β),¬(α∧¬β), α}. The following is a derivation
of γ from T :
1 ¬γ hypothesis
2 β hypothesis
3 α from T
4 α ∧ β ∧I
5 ¬(α ∧ β) from T
6 ⊥ ¬E
7 ¬β RA1
8 α from T
9 α ∧ ¬β ∧I
10 ¬(α ∧ ¬β) from T
11 ⊥ ¬E
12 γ RA2
Steps 1–11 form a sub-derivation of this derivation, and steps 2–6 are a
sub-derivation of this sub-derivation. Note that here the hypothesis of the
sub-derivation consisting of steps 1–11 is “vacuously discharged”, resulting
in the derivation of (any) γ from the (classically inconsistent) theory T .
We use T  φ to indicate that there is a derivation of a sentence φ from a
theory T , using the ND rules given above. Thus, in Example 1, T  α. Note
that ND as given above is a sound and complete proof system for PL when
theories are formulated using only the ¬ and ∧ connectives. Thus, T  φ iﬀ
T |= φ (namely φ is logically entailed by T in PL).
We distinguish between (direct) derivations not using the RA rule and
(indirect) derivations using the RA rule, and use the notion of direct deriva-
tion to deﬁne a notion of direct consistency:
Definition 1. [Direct Derivation and Direct Consistency] Let T be a
theory and φ a sentence. A direct derivation of φ (from T ) is a deriva-
tion of φ (from T ) that does not contain any application of the RA rule. If
there is a direct derivation of φ (from T ) we say that φ is directly derived (or
derived modulo RA) from T , denoted as T MRA φ. T is directly inconsistent
iﬀ T MRA ⊥, and directly consistent otherwise.
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Thus, in Example 1, T MRA γ by virtue of the following simple deriva-
tion:
1 γ ∧ δ from T
2 γ ∧E
However, for the same example, it is easy to see that T MRA α.
Trivially, if a theory is classically consistent then it is directly consistent,
e.g. as in the case of T in Example 1. However, a directly consistent theory
may be classically inconsistent, e.g. as in the case of T = {¬(α ∧ β),¬(α ∧
¬β), α} in Example 2. Throughout the paper, unless speciﬁed otherwise, we
assume as given a directly consistent theory T .
3. Motivation and Illustration
Let α, β, γ and δ be propositional formulae standing, respectively, for ‘avoid
steroids’ ‘get vaccine against hepatitis B’, ‘plan to travel to Africa’ and ‘plan
to visit friends’. Then, T in Example 1 represents the information that
you should not travel to Africa without getting vaccinated against hepatitis
B, and you should avoid steroids when getting a hepatitis B vaccine; in
addition, you are planning to travel to Africa to visit some friends. Given
this information:
Should you avoid steroids and if so why?
The ND derivation in Example 1 can be deemed to provide a positive answer
to the main question. We will see that the AL reading of this derivation,
aﬀorded by our correspondence results, gives an argumentative interpreta-
tion of the classical ND reasoning, allowing also to extract from the deriva-
tion a dialectical explanation as to why this is so.
AL interprets the question as to whether you should avoid steroids as:
Is α supported by an argument that can be deemed (dialectically)
acceptable? Orthogonally, is every argument supporting ¬α guaran-
teed to be (dialectically) non-acceptable?
Moreover, we deem α to be AL-entailed if and only if both these subsidiary
questions are answered positively, although, as we will prove later in Sec-
tion 6, in the case of classically consistent theories a positive answer to the
second question implies a positive answer to the ﬁrst. Thus in this special
case AL-entailment of a formula simply amounts to non-acceptability of its
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negation and the question as to whether and why you should avoid steroids
boils down to the single subsidiary question:
Is every argument supporting ¬α (dialectically) non-acceptable?
In general, note that the deﬁnition of AL-entailment in terms of both accept-
ability of a formula and non-acceptability of its complement amounts to a
“sceptical” view (not taking any chances when determining what is entailed).
A “credulous” view, corresponding to satisﬁability rather than entailment
in PL, amounts to allowing for a formula and its complement to be both
acceptable, but for neither to be AL-entailed. This view may be useful, in
particular, when the given theory is classically inconsistent.
In order to answer these questions we need to decide what we want to con-
sider as supporting arguments and how to determine the non-acceptability
of arguments. We could take the view that any ND derivation of α from a
given theory constitutes an argument supporting α, but this would imply
that, in the case of a classically inconsistent theory, we could ﬁnd a support-
ing argument for every formula, causing an “explosion” of the argumentative
reasoning (resulting from the application of the ex-falso quodlibet princi-
ple). To prevent this explosion, we could alternatively take the view that
any direct derivation of α constitutes an argument supporting α. We take
the view that arguments are sets of propositional formulae, added to the
given theory T and consider direct derivations from arguments during the
dialectical process to ascertain their (non-)acceptability. So, in Example 1,
T ∪ {α} is an argument supporting α.
Does T ∪ {¬α} form a non-acceptable argument for its (direct) conse-
quence ¬α? This argument may be deemed to be attacked, for example, by
T ∪{¬β}, since T ∪{¬α}∪{¬β} is directly inconsistent, and thus T ∪{¬β}
provides an objection against ¬α. Inconsistency is indeed a basic require-
ment for attack in argumentation in Artiﬁcial Intelligence when arguments
are considered in the setting of classical logic [2]. Alternative attacks against
T ∪ {¬α} exist, e.g. T ∪ {β}, as again T ∪ {¬α} ∪ {β} is directly inconsis-
tent. In order to deem T ∪ {¬α} (dialectically) non-acceptable, all possible
defences against at least one attack against it (e.g. the attack by T ∪ {¬β}
or the attack by T ∪ {β}) need to be (dialectically) non-acceptable in turn,
rendering the particular attacking argument an insurmountable hurdle for
the acceptability of T ∪ {¬α}. Overall, a (recursive) dialectical process is
required to ascertain this non-acceptability.
How do we deﬁne defence between arguments? Clearly, inconsistency
needs to be at the heart of this dialectical relation too. If we choose defence
244 A. C. Kakas et al.
to coincide with attack, however, since (direct) inconsistency is symmetric,
each argument can defend against any attack trivially by simply attacking
back. To avoid this trivialisation we can either tune the dialectical process
carefully, e.g. as done in [2], or choose for defence not to coincide with attack.
In AL we follow the latter option and deﬁne defence as a restricted form of
attack:
• defending against a directly consistent argument amounts to “undermin-
ing” the attack by providing an argument extending T with the negation
of some sentence in the attacking argument being defended against, and
• defending against a directly inconsistent, and hence “self-attacking” and
harmless, argument can be simply achieved by the trivial “empty” argu-
ment, consisting solely of the original theory.
Thus, in our example, both T ∪ {β} and T ∪ {} defend against the (directly
inconsistent) attacking argument T ∪ {¬β}, and T ∪ {¬β} defends against
the (directly consistent) attacking argument T ∪ {β}.
Given notions of arguments, attack and defence as above, non-
acceptability can be deﬁned, informally, as the “inability of arguments to
defend against their attacking arguments”, with empty attacks being triv-
ially defensible against and empty defences being trivially unattackable, and
hence trivially acceptable.
Overall, in our example, can T ∪{¬α} be deemed non-acceptable? As we
have seen, the argument T ∪ {β} attacks it and the only possible defence
against it is T ∪ {¬β}. This is directly inconsistent with the given theory,
and in particular with γ in it. Thus, the defence T ∪ {¬β} is attacked by
the empty argument and hence it is non-acceptable, giving that T ∪ {¬α}
is non-acceptable too. Intuitively, this dialectical process sanctioning the
non-acceptability of ¬α (and thus, since T is classically consistent, the AL-
entailment of α) can be read as follows:
• a legitimate objection against taking steroids/not avoiding them (¬α) is
supported by needing to get the hepatitis B vaccine (β);
• this objection can be defended against by simply deciding not to take
this vaccine (¬β);
• but this is at odds with the information in the given theory, and in
particular the decision to travel to Africa (γ)!
As we will see later in this paper, the choices of argument, non-acceptability
and AL-entailment informally illustrated here will allow us to provide an
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1 ¬α
2 ¬β
3 γ ∧ δ
4 γ
5 γ ∧ ¬β
6 ¬(γ ∧ ¬β)
7 ⊥
8 β
9 ¬α ∧ β
10 ¬(¬α ∧ β)
11 ⊥
12 α
Figure 1. An alternative ND derivation of α for Example 1
equivalent dialectical counter-part of ND in the case of classically con-
sistent theories. Speciﬁcally, the dialectical process sanctioning the non-
acceptability of ¬α informally illustrated before is the dialectical counter-
part of the sub-derivation of the ND derivation in Figure 1.5 Here, steps 1,
8–11 prove that T ∪{β} attacks T ∪{¬α} and the sub-derivation consisting
of steps 2–7 prove that all defences against this attack (namely T ∪ {¬β} )
are attacked by the empty argument and are thus non-acceptable.
The dialectical reading of the sub-derivation in Figure 1 is only possi-
ble because this sub-derivation and its own sub-derivation each need their
posited hypothesis to directly derive the inconsistency, namely, they satisfy
what we will call the genuine absurdity property (GAP). Instead, the original
derivation given in Example 1 is not GAP-fulﬁlling as the direct derivation
of inconsistency at step 12 does not need the hypothesis ¬α at step 1. Argu-
mentatively, the original derivation identiﬁes, at steps 7–11, the attacking
argument T∪{¬β} against T∪{¬α}, and, at steps 2–6, that the only possible
defence T ∪ {β} against this attack is attacked by the empty argument and
thus is non-acceptable, but it fails to recognise that the attacking argument
T ∪{¬β} is directly inconsistent and hence trivially defended against by the
(acceptable) empty argument. Thus, since non-acceptability requires that all
defences against some attack are non-acceptable, the argumentative reading
of this derivation does not allow us to conclude that ¬α is non-acceptable.
Indeed, the attacking argument T ∪ {¬β} this derivation identiﬁes is an
“irrelevant” attack against the argument T ∪ {¬α}, intuitively sanctioning
5From now on, for simplicity, we omit to indicate the ND rules used in derivations.
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that an objection against taking steroids/not avoiding them is supported by
not getting vaccinated against hepatitis B. Being (directly) inconsistent on
its own with the information in the given theory that you are travelling to
Africa, this argument could actually attack any argument, but, similarly, be
defended against by appealing to the decision to travel to Africa.
Thus, in general, only GAP-fulﬁlling ND derivations can be given a dialec-
tical, argumentative reading in AL. We will prove that, in the case of clas-
sically consistent theories, we can use restricted, GAP-fulﬁlling derivations
without loss of generality, and thus always guarantee a dialectical reading
of entailment in PL as illustrated above.
4. Argumentation Logic
In this section we deﬁne Argumentation Logic (AL) as in [19] but using
MRA as given in Section 2 for syntactically restricted propositional lan-
guages with ∧ and ¬ as the sole connectives rather than the notion of MRA
in [19] for propositional languages with all connectives. Note that the syn-
tactic restriction to ∧ and ¬ forces the classical interpretation of the other
connectives and does not cause a loss of generality.6
Definition 2. [Argumentation Logic Framework] The Argumentation Logic
(AL) framework corresponding to T is the triple 〈ArgsT , AttT , DefT 〉 with:
• ArgsT = {T ∪ Σ|Σ is a set of sentences } is the set of all expansions of
T by sets of sentences Σ ;
• given a, b ∈ ArgsT , with a = T ∪ Δ, b = T ∪ Γ, such that Δ = {},
(b, a) ∈ AttT iﬀ a ∪ b MRA ⊥;
• given a, d ∈ ArgsT , with a = T ∪ Δ, (d, a) ∈ DefT iﬀ
1. d = T ∪{φ} for some sentence φ ∈ Δ such that φ is the complement
of φ,7 or
2. d = T ∪ {} and a MRA ⊥.
6AL can be defined, as in [19], for unrestricted propositional languages simply by
using a suitably extended notion of direct derivation (MRA). Whether the correspon-
dence between AL and PL can still be proven when these connectives are explicit in the
underlying language is an open question, that we briefly discuss in Section 9.
7This notion of defence is a simplification of the notion in [19]. There, an attacking
argument with a negative sentence ¬ψ could be defended against by using ψ as well as
¬¬ψ. Since T ∪ {ψ} and T ∪ {¬¬ψ} are attacked by the same arguments, the simpler
notion here results in the same definition of AL.
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In the remainder, b attacks a (with respect to T ) stands for (b, a) ∈ AttT
and d defends, or is a defence against, a (with respect to T ) stands for
(d, a) ∈ DefT . Also, as in [19], we often use the set of sentences Σ to stand
for argument T ∪ Σ.
As an illustration, consider again the theory in Example 1: as we have
informally seen in Section 3, {¬α} is attacked by {β}, as T ∪ {¬α} ∪
{β} MRA ⊥ , i.e. the two arguments together directly derive an incon-
sistency; this attack can be defended against by {¬β}, attacked in turn by
{}, as T ∪ {¬β} MRA ⊥. This attack by the empty set (i.e. simply by the
given theory T ) cannot possibly be defended against, since T is (classically
and thus directly) consistent.
Note that the attack relation is symmetric except for the case of the
empty argument. Indeed, for a, b both non-empty, it is always the case that
a attacks b iﬀ b attacks a. However, the empty argument cannot be attacked
by any argument (as the attacked argument is required to be non-empty),
but the empty argument can attack an argument. Finally, note that our
notion of attack includes the special case of attack between a sentence and
its complement, since, for any theory T , for any sentence φ, {φ} attacks
{¬φ} (and vice-versa).
Note also that the defence relation is a subset of the attack relation. In the
ﬁrst case of the deﬁnition we defend against an argument by adopting the
complement of some sentence in the argument, whereas in the second case
we defend against any directly inconsistent set using the empty argument.
Also, trivially, if T is directly consistent as we are assuming, the empty
argument cannot be possibly defended against.
AL is deﬁned in terms of notions of acceptability and non-acceptability
of arguments to determine which conclusions can be dialectically justiﬁed
(or not) from the given theory. Given a generic AL framework, the intuition
behind acceptability is that “an argument is acceptable iﬀ all arguments
attacking it can be successfully defended against”. This intuition can be
(and has been) formalised in many alternative ways, e.g. via a notion of
admissibility as in [8], or via a judge function as in [2]. Here, in the tradi-
tion of [9,14] and more recently [16], we deﬁne acceptability as a “relative”
notion, whereby an acceptable argument can render each of its attacking
arguments non-acceptable by rendering a defence against it acceptable. As
in [19], we formalise acceptability and non-acceptability as least ﬁxed points
of (monotonic) operators on the binary Cartesian product of the set of argu-
ments, allowing to express (non-)acceptability as a relative notion, as follows.
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Definition 3. [Acceptability and Non-Acceptability Operators] Let
〈ArgsT , AttT , DefT 〉 be the AL framework corresponding to a directly con-
sistent theory T , and R the set of binary relations over ArgsT .
• The acceptability operator AT : R → R is deﬁned as follows: for any
acc ∈ R and a, a0 ∈ ArgsT : (a, a0) ∈ AT (acc) iﬀ
– a ⊆ a0, or
– for any b ∈ ArgsT such that b attacks a with respect to T ,
- b ⊆ a0 ∪ a, and
- there is d ∈ ArgsT that defends against b with respect to T
such that (d, a0 ∪ a) ∈ acc.
• The non-acceptability operator NT : R → R is deﬁned as follows: for any
nacc ∈ R and a, a0 ∈ ArgsT : (a, a0) ∈ NT (nacc) iﬀ
– a ⊆ a0, and
– there is b ∈ ArgsT such that b attacks a with respect to T and
- b ⊆ a0 ∪ a, or
- for any d ∈ ArgsT that defends against b with respect to T ,
(d, a0 ∪ a) ∈ nacc.
NACCT and ACCT are deﬁned as the least ﬁxed points of the NT and
AT operators, respectively.
It is easy to see that the given operators are monotonic, and thus accept-
ability and non-acceptability are well deﬁned. Note that non-acceptability,
NACCT (a, a0), is the same as the classical negation of ACCT (a, a0), i.e.
NACCT (a, a0) = ¬ACCT (a, a0). Also, note that NACCT and ACCT are
such that
• ACCT (a, a0), read a is acceptable with respect to a0 in T , iﬀ
– a ⊆ a0, or
– for all b ∈ ArgsT such that b attacks a:
– b ⊆ a0 ∪ a, and
– there exists d ∈ ArgsT such that d defends against b and
ACCT (d, a0 ∪ a);
• NACCT (a, a0), read a is not acceptable with respect to a0 in T , iﬀ
– a ⊆ a0 and
– there exists b ∈ ArgsT such that b attacks a and
– b ⊆ a0 ∪ a, or
– for all d ∈ ArgsT such that d defends against b it holds that
NACCT (d, a0 ∪ a).
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Figure 2. Illustration of NACCT ({¬α}, {}) (left) and of failure to prove
NACCT ({¬α}, {}) (right), for the theory in Example 1 (where ↑ indi-
cates ‘attack’ and ⇑ indicates ‘defence’)
In the remainder, we say that a is (non-)acceptable (in T ) when a is
(non-)acceptable with respect to the empty set (in T ).
Figure 2 (left) illustrates, for the theory T in Example 1, the non-
acceptability of ¬α (i.e. that NACCT ({¬α}, {}) holds). Here, the (empty)
leaf attack cannot be defended against and hence ¬β is non-acceptable,
giving in turn that ¬α is non-acceptable. This proof of non-acceptability
corresponds to the dialectical process informally sanctioning the non-
acceptability of ¬α in Section 3. Figure 2 (right) illustrates a failed
attempt at determining the non-acceptability of ¬α. Here, whereas the
defence {β} in the left-most branch is non-acceptable, relative to {¬α} (as
NACCT ({β}, {¬α}) holds), the empty defence in the right-most branch is
acceptable, relative to {¬α} or any other argument. Thus, the right-most
branch fails to meet the requirement for NACCT ({¬α}, {}) to hold.
As an illustration of acceptability, consider again the theory in Example 1
and a model of T ∪ {α} . We can then use the chosen model to show that
α is acceptable (i.e. that ACCT ({α}, {}) holds). Indeed each attack against
α must contain at least a sentence that is false in the model and thus each
attack can be defended against by the complement of this sentence, which
is true in the chosen model. For example, in the case of T in Example 1, the
attack by ¬α can be defended against by α itself (as α is necessarily true in
any model of T∪{α}). Similarly, the attack by ¬¬¬α can be defended against
by ¬¬α, which is true in the model. Also, the attack by {¬(α ∧ ¬γ),¬γ}
can be defended against by γ or by {}. Figure 3 illustrates the acceptability
of α. Note that there are inﬁnitely many attacks against α but for any such
attack there exists a sentence in the attack that is false in the chosen model
and whose complement can be used as defence. Since these defences are
true in the model we can again choose defences against arguments attacking
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Figure 3. (Partial) illustration of ACCT ({α}, {}) for the theory in Example 1
these defences from the chosen model, and so recursively determine the
acceptability of {α} by determining the acceptability of the defences.
Informally, in the spirit of the illustration in Section 3, the dialectical
process sanctioning the acceptability of α in Figure 3 can be read as follows:
• objections to (attacks against) avoiding steroids based on recommending
to take them instead may be defended against by restating one’s position
to avoid steroids, and
• objection based on the hypothesis of not planning to go to Africa may be
defended against by pointing out that this is at odds with the contrary
belief in T that you are actually planning to go to Africa;
• since each of these defending arguments (as well as defending arguments
against attacks omitted for simplicity) can be deemed to be acceptable
in turn, the original argument for avoiding steroids can be too.
Motivated by the argumentation perspective, where an argument is held if it
can be successfully defended and it cannot be successfully objected against,
entailment in AL is deﬁned in terms of the notions of acceptability and
non-acceptability, as follows:
Definition 4. [AL-entailment] Let φ be a sentence and φ its complement.
Then φ is AL-entailed by T (denoted T |=AL φ) iﬀ ACCT ({φ}, {}) and
NACCT ({φ}, {}).
Hence, for T of Example 1, since we have seen that α is acceptable and
¬α is not, it holds that T |=AL α. Note that in general, trivially, a theory
cannot AL-entail both a sentence and its complement.
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5. Genuine Absurdity Property (GAP)
In this section we formalise GAP for ND derivations of the form considered in
Section 2. As we discussed in Section 3, we will use GAP to deﬁne the formal
correspondence between AL and PL. GAP is motivated by the dialectical
argumentative perspective that self-attacking arguments can be trivially
defended against and thus should not inﬂuence the result of argumentative
reasoning. In the setting of AL, these self-attacking arguments amount to
directly inconsistent extensions of the given (directly consistent) theory, and
GAP amounts to excluding ND derivations that correspond to the use of
such self-attacking arguments.
The GAP property is a property on the application of RA. We refer to
ND derivations with an outermost application of the RA rule as Reductio
ad Absurdum ND (RAND) derivations.
Definition 5. [RAND-derivation] Let φ be a sentence and φ its comple-
ment. A RAND derivation of φ from T is a ND derivation of φ from T of
the form (for n > 1)
1 φ hypothesis
...
...
...
... ⊥ ...
n φ RA
Trivially, if there is a ND derivation of a sentence, then there is a RAND
derivation of that sentence. Thus, in the remainder we focus on RAND
derivations.
We use the following terminology: an immediate sub-derivation of a
(sub-)derivation d is the sequence of all steps in a sub-derivation d′ of d
which are not part of any sub-derivation of d′. As an illustration, in Exam-
ple 1, steps 1,7–12 form an immediate sub-derivation d′ of the derivation
consisting of steps 1–13 and steps 2–6 form an immediate sub-derivation
d′′ of d′. In the remainder of the paper, with an abuse of notation we will
refer to immediate sub-derivations simply as sub-derivations. Moreover, if d
is a sub-derivation of a derivation from T we say that d is a sub-derivation
from T . Furthermore, if d′ is a sub-derivation of d, then d (respectively d′)
is called a direct ancestor (respectively child) of d′ (respectively d) in d;
an ancestor of a sub-derivation d′ is a direct ancestor of d′ or, recursively,
a direct ancestor of an ancestor of d′; similarly, a descendant of a (sub-)
derivation d is a child of d or, recursively, a child of a descendant of d; a
leaf sub-derivation is a descendant with no children. As an illustration, in
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Example 1, the sub-derivation consisting of steps 1, 7–12 is a direct ances-
tor of the sub-derivation consisting of steps 2–6, and the latter is a leaf and
a child of the former. Further, every RAND derivation d has exactly one
child, which we call the root sub-derivation of d. Non-root sub-derivations
may have one, none or several children/descendants. Finally, we adopt the
following notation :
Notation 1. Given a RAND derivation d and a sub-derivation d′ of d , d′
is denoted by
d′ = φ : c(φ1), . . . , c(φk);ψ1, . . . , ψl : ⊥
where k, l ≥ 0 and
• φ is the hypothesis of d′;
• {φ1, . . . , φk} is the set of all hypotheses χ of RAND (sub-)derivations d′′
of d such that d′′ is an ancestor of d′ in d and χ is copied in d′;
• {ψ1, . . . , ψl} is the set of all hypotheses of child RAND sub-derivations
of d′ in d, and, for all j = 1, . . . , l, ψi is the complement of ψi.
Example 3. Given the theory T = {¬(α ∧ ¬β),¬(β ∧ γ),¬(α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ)},
the child sub-derivation d1 of the RAND derivation d of ¬α in Figure 4,
consisting of steps 1 and 13–16, is denoted as8
α : −;¬β : ⊥
Note that d1 is also the root sub-derivation of d. The sub-derivation d2
consisting of steps 2, 9–12 in Figure 4 is a descendant of d, a child of d1,
and the (direct) ancestor of the sub-derivation d3 consisting of steps 3–8 in
Figure 4. d3 is a leaf of d.
Note that, in general, there are no copies (namely k = 0) in root sub-
derivations, such as the earlier d1 = α : −;¬β : ⊥ in Figure 4. Note
also that there are no hypotheses of sub-derivations in leaves of RAND
derivations. The leaf d3 for the same Example 3 will thus be denoted as
¬γ : c(α), c(β);− : ⊥
With an abuse of notation, we will often use a combined notation for
RAND derivations and their sub-derivations, e.g. the RAND derivation
in Example 3 may also be denoted as
α : −; β : −; ¬γ : c(α), c(β);− : ⊥ : ⊥ : ⊥
8We use – to denote the empty sequence.
On Argumentation Logic and Propositional Logic 253
d1:
1 α d2:
2 β d3:
3 ¬γ
4 c(α)
5 c(β)
6 α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ
7 ¬(α ∧ β ∧ ¬γ)
8 ⊥
9 γ
10 β ∧ γ
11 ¬(β ∧ γ)
12 ⊥
13 ¬β
14 α ∧ ¬β
15 ¬(α ∧ ¬β)
16 ⊥
17 ¬α
Figure 4. RAND derivation of ¬α from T in Example 3, with sub-
derivations d1, d2, d3 explicitly indicated
It is important to note that, for any sub-derivation
φ : c(φ1), . . . , c(φk);ψ1, . . . , ψl : ⊥
from T , it holds that
T ∪ {φ} ∪ {φ1, . . . , φk} ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψl} MRA ⊥
i.e. the inconsistency is directly derivable from the set of hypotheses copied
from ancestor sub-derivations and the set of the complements of the
hypotheses of all children sub-derivations, together with the hypothesis
posited at the start of the RAND derivation. This simple observation pro-
vides a basic link between RAND derivations and their argumentative read-
ing, as it indicates that {φ} ∪ {φ1, . . . , φk} ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψl} attacks {φ}. Note
that the argumentative reading of RAND derivations imply that, for any
sub-derivation d′ = φ : c(φ1), . . . , c(φk);ψ1, . . . , ψl : ⊥, {φ1, . . . , φk} can
exclude any hypotheses in ancestors of d′ that are not used for the direct
derivation of ⊥ in d′, as any other such hypotheses would be superﬂuous
254 A. C. Kakas et al.
to the corresponding attack. Moreover, {ψ1, . . . , ψl} can be chosen to be
minimal, in the sense that all ψi are needed for the derivation of ⊥ in d′.
In other words, we can assume that there are no “redundancies” in any
sub-derivation.9
The GAP property is deﬁned to disallow sub-derivations that corre-
spond to attacking arguments which are directly inconsistent with the given
(directly consistent) theory:
Definition 6. [Genuine Absurdity Property (GAP)] Let d = φ : c(φ1),
. . . , c(φk);ψ1, . . . , ψl : ⊥ be a sub-derivation from T . Then d satisﬁes the
genuine absurdity property (with respect to T ) iﬀ
T ∪ {φ1, . . . , φk} ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψl} MRA ⊥.
Moreover, d fully satisﬁes the genuine absurdity property (with respect to
T ) iﬀ it satisﬁes the genuine absurdity property (with respect to T ) and all
its descendant sub-derivations satisfy the genuine absurdity property (with
respect to T ). Finally, a RAND derivation from T fully satisﬁes the genuine
absurdity property (with respect to T ) iﬀ all its descendant sub-derivations
satisfy the genuine absurdity property (with respect to T ).
In other words, the genuine absurdity property is satisﬁed by a sub-
derivation when its hypothesis is necessary (as opposed to simply used) for
the direct derivation of ⊥. Note that a RAND derivation fully satisﬁes the
genuine absurdity property iﬀ all its sub-derivations and, recursively, their
sub-derivations do so.
The RAND derivation in Figure 4 fully satisﬁes the genuine absurdity
property (with respect to T in Example 3). This is because T ∪{¬β} MRA
⊥, T ∪{γ} MRA ⊥ and T ∪{α, β} MRA ⊥. Instead, the RAND derivation
of α in Example 1 does not satisfy the genuine absurdity property in the
root sub-derivation, as ¬β is directly inconsistent with T without the need
of the hypothesis ¬α, whereas the alternative RAND derivation of α given
in Figure 1, from the same theory of Example 1, fully satisﬁes the genuine
absurdity property.
RAND derivations that fully satisfy the genuine absurdity property
always exist for a classically consistent theory:
Lemma 1. Let T be a classically consistent theory, φ be a sentence, and d
be a RAND derivation of the complement φ of φ from T . Then there exists
9We are not addressing here the computational issues of constructing or determining
RAND derivations with no redundancies. These and other computational issues concern
future work.
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α α
β ¬β
c(α) γ
α ∧ β γ ∧ ¬β
⊥ ⊥
¬β β
γ α ∧ β
γ ∧ ¬β ⊥
⊥ ¬α
¬α
Figure 5. Alternative RAND derivations of ¬α in Example 4: non-GAP
fulfilling d (left) and GAP fulfilling d′ (right)
a RAND derivation d′ of φ from T that fully satisﬁes the genuine absurdity
property.
The proof of this central technical lemma is given in “Appendix A”. The
following example illustrates the lemma and the main idea behind its proof.
Example 4. Consider the theory T = {¬(α ∧ β),¬(γ ∧ ¬β), γ}. A possi-
ble RAND derivation of ¬α from T is d in Figure 5 (left), with root sub-
derivation d1 denoted:
d1 = α : −; β : c(α);− : ⊥ : ⊥
This does not satisfy the genuine absurdity property as in the root sub-
derivation α : −;¬β : ⊥ the hypothesis α is not needed to derive ⊥, since
¬β is directly inconsistent with T . But we can “ﬂip” the sub-derivation
d2 = β : c(α);− : ⊥ “on α” and “reverse” the root sub-derivation d1 to
construct a RAND derivation d′ of ¬α that satisﬁes the genuine absurdity
property. This is d′ given in Figure 5 (right), with root sub-derivation:
d′1 = α : −; ¬β : −;− : ⊥ : ⊥
We are thus using the copy of the sentence α in the sub-derivation d2 of
d to guide the construction of a new RAND derivation d′ that satisﬁes the
genuine absurdity property.
Note that the lemma does not hold in the case of classically inconsistent
theories, as illustrated by the following example.
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Example 5. Let T = {α,¬α}, and let L include atoms α and β. Then no
RAND derivation of β from T fully satisﬁes the genuine absurdity property.
6. Correspondence Between AL and PL
In order to show the correspondence of logical entailment in PL and AL-
entailment, we ﬁrst show that, for any directly consistent theory, if a sentence
is non-acceptable in AL then its complement is provable in PL:
Theorem 2. Let φ be a sentence. If NACCT ({φ}, {}) holds then there exists
a RAND derivation of the complement φ of φ from T .
The proof of this theorem, already given in [19], can be found in “Appen-
dix B” for completeness of presentation.
Conversely, for any directly consistent theory, if the complement of a
sentence is provable in PL by a GAP-fulﬁlling RAND derivation, then the
sentence is non-acceptable in AL:
Theorem 3. Let φ be a sentence, and φ its complement. If there exists
a RAND derivation of φ from T that fully satisﬁes the genuine absurdity
property (with respect to T ) then NACCT ({φ}, {}) holds.
The proof of this theorem can be found in “Appendix C”.
As an illustration of this result, consider again the RAND derivation in
Figure 1, a derivation that fully satisﬁes the genuine absurdity property. Its
root sub-derivation can be interpreted as not sanctioning ¬α or rendering
¬α non-acceptable on argumentative grounds, as we have already illustrated
in Section 3.
Finally, we give the equivalence result, for classically consistent theories:
Theorem 4. Let T be a classically consistent theory and φ be a sentence.
Then T  φ iﬀ T |=AL φ
Proof. Let T |=AL φ. By Deﬁnition 4, NACCT ({φ}, {}) holds. By Theo-
rem 2, there exists a RAND derivation of φ from T and trivially T  φ.
Let T  φ. Then there exists a RAND derivation of φ from T . By
Lemma 1, since T is classically consistent, there is a RAND derivation
of φ that fully satisﬁes the genuine absurdity property. By Theorem 3,
NACCT ({φ}, {}) holds. To prove that T |=AL φ we are left to prove
that ACCT ({φ}, {}) holds. Suppose, by contradiction, that ACCT ({φ}, {})
does not hold. Then NACCT ({φ}, {}) holds (since NACCT ({φ}, {}) =
¬ACCT ({φ}, {})) and by Theorem 2 there is a RAND derivation of φ from
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T . Thus T  φ, which implies that T is classically inconsistent: contradic-
tion.
This theorem shows that, for classically consistent theories expressed using
only the connectives ¬,∧, a restricted form of the RA inference rules does not
compromise the completeness of the ND proof system. Since all PL theories
can be equivalently expressed using the connectives ¬,∧, our restricted form
of ND is a complete proof system for (consistent) PL.
Theorem 2 also implies that, in the case of classically consistent theories,
AL-entailment of propositional formulae, amounting to sceptically determin-
ing both the acceptability of the formulae and the non-acceptability of their
complements, can be solely determined by determining the latter.
Proposition 1. Let T be classically consistent and φ a sentence with com-
plement φ. If NACCT ({φ}, {}) holds then ACCT ({φ}, {}) also holds.
Proof. By Theorem 2, since NACCT ({φ}, {}), then T  φ. Suppose, by
contradiction, that ACCT ({φ}, {}) does not hold. Then NACCT ({φ}, {})
holds (since NACCT ({φ}, {}) = ¬ACCT ({φ}, {})) and by Theorem 2 there
is a RAND derivation of φ from T and thus T  φ. This implies that T is
classically inconsistent: contradiction.
Corollary 5. Let T be a classically consistent theory and φ a sentence
with complement φ. Then T |=AL φ iﬀ NACCT ({φ}, {}).
7. Discussion: AL Beyond Consistent PL
We have shown in Section 6 that AL-entailment and classical entailment/ND
in PL coincide in the special case of classically consistent theories expressed
in the PL fragment restricted to the ∧ and ¬ connectives. This result is based
upon an argumentative reading of GAP-fulﬁlling RAND derivations, and it
holds for any directly (rather than just classically) consistent theories. In this
section we discuss the use of GAP-fulﬁlling RAND derivations and their
equivalent argumentative reading in the case of non-classically (but directly)
consistent theories, exploring in particular whether these derivations give a
paraconsistent form of reasoning and their corresponding AL reading fulﬁls
in full the vocation of argumentation to handle conﬂicts.
As a ﬁrst example, consider T = {¬(α ∧ β),¬(γ ∧ ¬β), γ, α} (this is the
theory in Example 4 extended with α). T is directly, but not classically,
consistent. It is easy to see that there are GAP-fulﬁlling RAND deriva-
tions for both β and ¬β. Hence, by Theorem 3, NACCT ({¬β}, {}) and
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NACCT ({β}, {}) both hold and thus neither β nor ¬β are (sceptically)
AL-entailed by T (but both may be credulously adopted). However, both
γ and α are (sceptically) AL-entailed by T while their negation is not.10
Thus, AL does not trivialise in this example. In general, in the case of
directly consistent theories, we can still draw the following (weaker) connec-
tion between direct derivations and AL-entailment, giving that AL may be
deemed to give a paraconsistent extension of classical PL where (at least)
the direct consequences of the given theory are AL-entailed :
Proposition 2. Let T be a directly consistent theory and φ a sentence such
that T MRA φ. Then T |=AL φ.
Proof.11 Let a = T ∪Δ be any attack against {φ}, i.e. T ∪ {φ} ∪Δ MRA
⊥. Since T MRA φ then T ∪ Δ MRA ⊥. Since T is directly consistent,
Δ = {}. Hence any such a can be defended against by the empty argument.
Since ACCT ({},Σ), for any set of sentences Σ, then ACCT ({φ}, {}) holds.
Moreover, since T MRA φ, necessarily T ∪{¬φ} MRA ⊥. Hence the empty
argument attacks {¬φ} and thus NACCT ({¬φ}, {}) holds.
The proof of this result indicates that AL can contain the explosion of
PL, resulting from applying the ex-falso quodlibet principle, when directly
inconsistent attacking (defending) arguments can be identiﬁed while prov-
ing the acceptability (non-acceptability, respectively) of arguments, since
directly inconsistent arguments are trivially defended against (attacked,
respectively) by the (acceptable) empty argument. This feature of AL, of
essentially factoring out directly inconsistent arguments, is linked to the
GAP restriction in RAND derivations. We illustrate this feature and its link
to the containment of ex-falso quodlibet beyond Proposition 2 (namely for
sentences that are not direct consequences of the theory) with the following
example.12
Example 6. Let T1 = {¬(¬α ∧ γ),¬(¬α ∧ ¬γ),¬α} and T2 = {¬(¬α ∧
γ),¬(¬α ∧ ¬γ),¬(α ∧ δ),¬(α ∧ ¬δ)}. Both are directly consistent but clas-
sically inconsistent. Consider an arbitrary sentence β which is not a direct
consequence of any of Ti for i = 1, 2, i.e. such that Ti MRA β. It is easy to
see that there are RAND derivations of β and ¬β from both theories: using
the combined notation for RAND derivations and their sub-derivations from
10As we have mentioned at the end of Section 4, in general, for any directly consistent
theory T and sentence φ, if T |=AL φ then T |=AL φ, trivially by definition of |=AL.
11This proof, already given in [19], is included here for completeness of presentation.
12We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting a variant of this example.
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Section 5, the root sub-derivations of two possible RAND derivations of ¬β
(from T1 and T2) may be represented (respectively) as
d1 : β : −; ¬α : −; ¬γ : c(¬α);− : ⊥ : ⊥,
α ∧ β : −;− : ⊥ : ⊥
d2 : β : −; ¬α : −; ¬γ : c(¬α);− : ⊥ : ⊥,
α ∧ β : −; δ : c(α ∧ β);− : ⊥ : ⊥ : ⊥
Note that both d1 and d2 have two children sub-derivations, with hypotheses
¬α and α ∧ β. More importantly, the derivation with sub-derivation d2 is
GAP-fulﬁlling, whereas the one with sub-derivation d1 is not. Indeed, T2 ∪
{α,¬(α ∧ β)} MRA ⊥ whereas T1 ∪ {α} MRA ⊥ and thus T1 ∪ {α,¬(α ∧
β)} MRA ⊥, namely the hypothesis of d1 is not necessary for the direct
derivation of inconsistency.13 Similarly, we can construct a GAP-fulﬁlling
RAND derivation of β from T2.
Thus, in the case of the ﬁrst, but not the second, theory in this exam-
ple, GAP-fulﬁlment acts as a barrier against explosion of non-direct conse-
quences. In order to prevent this explosion in the case of the second theory
and in general, the notion of GAP-fulﬁlment needs to be revised. Although
this revision is outside the scope of this paper, we discuss here a possible
direction for it, driven by the dialectical perspective aﬀorded by AL. Let us
revisit Example 6 dialectically (with A = {α,¬(α ∧ β)} from now on):
• d1 identiﬁes the attacking argument A against {β}, but, as the GAP-
violation shows, this is directly inconsistent with the theory (T1) alone,
and thus trivially defended against by the (acceptable) empty argu-
ment; hence A is not a suitable attacking argument to ascertain the
non-acceptability of {β};
• d2 also identiﬁes the attacking argument A against {β}, but this is
directly consistent with the theory (T2) and hence can no longer be
defended against by the empty argument (or any other acceptable argu-
ment; indeed, by Theorem 3, NACCT2({β}, {}) holds).
Nevertheless, in both cases the attacking argument A is dialectically “prob-
lematic”: in the ﬁrst case it is “self-attacking”, and thus non-acceptable
(with respect to any argument that does not contain it, formally, for any
a0 ⊇ A, NACCT2(A, a0)), and, in the second case, it is non-self-attacking
13 Note that, since T1 ∪ {α} MRA ⊥, an alternative root sub-derivation of a RAND-
derivation of ¬β from T1 is β : −; ¬α : −; ¬γ : c(¬α);− : ⊥	 : ⊥	 : ⊥	. This is also
non-GAP-fulfilling, exactly because {α} is directly inconsistent with T1.
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but still non-acceptable with respect to the empty argument and, impor-
tantly, with respect to {β} whose acceptability status we are examining
(formally NACCT2(A, {}) and NACCT2(A, {β})). In AL as deﬁned in [19]
and in this paper, self-attacking arguments play a role in the base case of
non-acceptability (as the empty argument is contained in any argument) but
non-self-attacking but still non-acceptable arguments do not contribute to
the base case. To strengthen the control of AL over explosion and disregard,
in the case of T2 in Example 6, the problematic attacking argument, we
could thus bring the deﬁnition of AL closer to the full abstract acceptability
semantics of [9,14–16], where the ﬁxed point deﬁnitions of acceptability and
non-acceptability are interleaved, as expressed informally by “an argument
is acceptable if and only if all its attacking arguments are rendered non-
acceptable”. This possibility and the question of how GAP for ND could
correspondingly be adapted are important matters of future work.
8. Related Work
We have drawn a formal link between ND from classically consistent theories
in PL and argumentation in AL. The link between logic and argumentation
has been widely studied in the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (e.g. see [1,2,4]).
Existing studies are mainly concerned with how to use classical logic or frag-
ments thereof on which to build argumentation frameworks. In contrast, our
work shows that argumentation can provide the foundation to build logical
frameworks and in particular to reconstruct, from an argumentation basis,
classical PL. In particular, the main technical diﬀerence between AL and
other logic-based argumentation formalisms is that, rather than including
RA in the underlying logic layer to build argumentation frameworks, AL
recovers the eﬀects of RA semantically, via non-acceptability. This could
simplify/facilitate the development of the argumentation frameworks, for
example when adding explicit preferences on the arguments or their compo-
nents, by allowing to control the explosion of (irrelevant) arguments, attacks
and defences between arguments. Moreover, the separation between a logic
layer and an argumentation layer, widespread in much argumentation in
AI, is shown by our results not to be necessary, and a uniform treatment of
logic and argumentation, as aﬀorded by AL, may play a signiﬁcant role in
Cognitive Computing, as discussed in [13,17].
We have seen that, in the case of directly consistent but classically incon-
sistent theories, RAND derivations satisfying GAP and their dialectical re-
interpretation in AL provide a form of paraconsistent reasoning. Various
paraconsistent propositional logics have been proposed (see e.g. [22]). Some
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of these logics can also be seen as restricting the application of RA in ND in
order to control the ex-falso quodlibet principle. For example, D’Ottaviano
and De Castro [5,7] have pointed out that the task of blocking explosion
in Da Costa’s paraconsistent C-systems [3] can be studied in terms of ND
systems where the application of RA is restricted to contradictions derived
from a sub-class of well behaved formulae in Da Costa’s hierarchy.
AL falls within the purely proof-theoretic logic tradition, because of
the link between AL and (GAP-fulﬁlling) ND. In particular, AL may be
seen as following in spirit some of Tennant’s works [24–26], sharing their
aim to develop proof theories that on the one hand preserve fully classical
entailment from consistent theories but on the other hand do not trivialise
when the theories are inconsistent.14 This is given by discarding the ex-
falso quodlibet principle as well as some forms of reasoning, e.g., in [24], the
excluded middle law, while keeping others, e.g., again in [24], the disjunctive
syllogism (or resolution). Moreover, these works consider ways of normal-
ising ND proofs, in the tradition of [20], by forcing deductive relevance,
namely that conclusions of valid deductions need to follow from premises
that are somehow “linked” to them. The GAP-fulﬁlment restriction in ND
derivability shares the same aims as the restrictions to normal proofs.
We leave the study of the formal link between GAP-fulﬁlling ND and
normal proofs as future work. The study of this link may give insights as
to how the GAP property could be generalised to further control and con-
tain explosion. Furthermore, the study of this link may help examine the
transitivity of AL entailment, from the point of view of AL seen as a sys-
tem of dialectical argumentation rather than a counterpart of a restricted
form of ND. In addition, the notion of normal proofs could be exploited in
AL to develop eﬀective decision procedures for determining acceptability by
focusing attention on attacking arguments that are linked to normal proofs
of contradiction.
The study of the formal relationship between (forms of) AL and para-
consistent variants of PL is beyond the scope of this paper and is left as
future work.
14Non-proof theoretical approaches to support paraconsistent reasoning with the aim
of preserving classical reasoning from consistent theories exist, see e.g. [21] and references
therein.
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9. Conclusions
We have shown that the recently proposed Argumentation Logic (AL) of
[19] and classical Propositional Logic (PL) are equivalent in the case of clas-
sically consistent theories. This equivalence implies that classical reasoning
(in PL) can be given an alternative argumentative reading. The equiva-
lence is proven using a restricted form of Natural Deduction (ND), where
Reductio ad Absurdum (RA) is required to satisfy the Genuine Absurdity
Property (GAP), forcing relevance of the hypothesis in the direct (namely
without using RA) derivation of inconsistency. The equivalence holds since
this restriction does not compromise the completeness of ND for classically
consistent theories expressed using conjunction and negation only. We have
also shown that, in the case of directly consistent theories (namely theories
from which inconsistency cannot be directly derived) which are not classi-
cally consistent, AL controls, to a certain extent, the explosion of PL by the
ex-falso quodlibet principle.
This paper paves the way to much future work, summarised as follows.
We have indicated a possible direction to further control the explosion of
PL in the case of classically inconsistent but directly consistent theories, by
extending the (non-)acceptability semantics in line with its use in abstract
dialectical settings [9,14–16], where acceptability and non-acceptability
recursively inﬂuence one another. This will also require a modiﬁcation of the
GAP property and the introduction of new restricted forms of ND deriva-
tions.
In this paper we did not consider directly inconsistent theories. In [19] we
have indicated a possible direction for reasoning with these general theories,
by focusing on directly consistent sub-theories. This or alternative directions
require additional future work.
We proved that AL and PL are equivalent for restricted theories expressed
using the ¬ and ∧ connectives only, without loss of generality. When other
connectives are explicitly included in the language and ND suitable extended
to accommodate them, the interpretation of this connectives in AL may not
be classical. A proper investigation of this aspect requires further study.
In our study of the formal connection between AL and PL we have ignored
computational issues and in particular issues of computational complexity.
Interesting questions in this landscape include: What is the complexity of
checking that a derivation is GAP-fulﬁlling? What is the best algorithm for
checking GAP-fulﬁlment? What are the complexity of/a procedural mecha-
nism for testing whether an argument is (non-)acceptable? Is this complexity
On Argumentation Logic and Propositional Logic 263
higher in the case of directly consistent but classically inconsistent theories?
Can complexity results from argumentation theory [6,10] help us with the
study of the computational complexity of AL? Identifying answers for these
and related questions will require further work.
Several related works deﬁne non-classical, paraconsistent, or argumentat-
ion-based logics. We have brieﬂy discussed the connection between AL and
GAP-fulﬁlling ND with a subset of these related works that share some of
our motivations. The study of the formal relationship between (forms of)
AL and these and other extensions/variants of PL is beyond the scope of
this paper and is left as future work.
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A. Proof of Lemma 1
Throughout this proof, for simplicity, we will use ¬ to stand for complement.
Thus, for any propositional formula χ, ¬χ will stand for the complement
of χ and ¬¬χ will stand for χ, i.e. the complement of the complement
of χ. Similarly, for a set of formulae Ψ, ¬Ψ will stand for the set of the
complements of formulae in Ψ. Also, we will say that a sub-derivation φ :
c(φ1), . . . , c(φk);¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψl : ⊥ is a sub-derivation of ¬φ.
To prove the lemma, we use an ordering on RAND derivations, as follows.
Definition 7. [Derivation Ordering] Let T be a classically consistent propo-
sitional theory, χ a sentence in L and d′ and d′′ be two RAND derivations
from T of ¬χ such that d′′ can be obtained from d′ by replacing a sub-
derivation sd′ of some ¬χ′ with some other sub-derivation, sd′′ of ¬χ′, and
vice versa. Then d′′ < d′ iﬀ the number of sub-derivations of d′′ that violate
GAP is strictly smaller than the number of sub-derivations of d′ that violate
GAP.
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When d′′ < d′ we say that d′′ is simpler than d′.
We prove the lemma using the following further lemma.
Lemma 6. Let T be a classically consistent propositional theory. Let d1 be
a RAND derivation of a sentence ¬φ1 ∈ L from T , such that d1 does not
satisfy GAP. Then there exists a RAND derivation d′1 of ¬φ1 from T that
is simpler than d1.
Lemma 1 then follows directly by repeatedly applying this Lemma 6 to
d until no GAP violation exists, since there can only be ﬁnitely many GAP
violations in the given RAND derivation d.
Before we prove Lemma 6 we give some further notation.
A.1. Notation
We will often denote a RAND derivation or a sub-derivation d of ¬φ as d(φ).
Also, we will denote
d = φ : c(φ1), . . . , c(φh);¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn : ⊥
as
d(φ) = φ : c(Φ(d));¬Ψ(d) : ⊥ or d = φ : c(Φ);¬Ψ : ⊥
where c(Φ(d)) and c(Φ) are used as a shorthand for c(φ1), . . . , c(φh) and
¬Ψ(d) and ¬Ψ are used as a shorthand for ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn.
With an abuse of notation, we will sometimes treat sequences as sets,
and write, for example, Φ∪Ψ to indicate {χ|χ is an element in the sequence
Φ or Ψ}.
A child sub-derivation, d′(ψ), of d will also be denoted by child(d,ψ)
(where ψ is the hypothesis of the child sub-derivation d′). The set of all child
sub-derivations of d will be denoted by children(d) or children(Ψ(d)), where
Ψ(d) is the sequence/set of the hypotheses of all the child sub-derivations
of d. Then we will also denote a sub-derivation d(φ) by
φ : c(Φ(d)); children(Ψ(d)) : ⊥ or φ : c(Φ); children(Ψ) : ⊥.
Given a sub-derivation d = φ : c(Φ); children(Ψ) : ⊥ we will denote by the
ordered list
H(d) = [φ1, . . . , φm] (m ≥ 1)
the list of hypotheses of the ancestor sub-derivations of d starting from the
hypothesis φ1 of the root sub-derivation to which d belongs down to φm,
the hypothesis of the sub-derivation of which d is a child. Note that when d
is a root sub-derivation then H(d) = [].
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A.2. Proof of Lemma 6
We will prove the lemma for d1 “fully non-redundant”, in the following sense.
Definition 8. A sub-derivation d = φ : c(Φ);¬Ψ : ⊥ from T is non-
redundant iﬀ there exists no S ⊂ Φ ∪ ¬Ψ such that T ∪ {φ} ∪ S MRA ⊥
holds. A sub-derivation is fully non-redundant iﬀ it is non-redundant and
all its descendants are non-redundant. A RAND derivation is fully non-
redundant iﬀ all its descendants are non-redundant
A fully non-redundant (sub-)derivation contains no redundant copies of
ancestor hypotheses or hypotheses of child sub-derivations. Without loss of
generality we can assume that RAND derivations and their sub-derivations
are fully non-redundant15 since we can drop from (sub-)derivations any
copies of ancestor hypotheses or child sub-derivations that are not necessary
for the direct derivation of inconsistency, without aﬀecting the conclusion of
these (sub-)derivations.
Let us assume that the GAP violation occurs in a sub-derivation dj of d1
given by
dj = φj : c(Φ(dj)); children(Ψ(dj)) : ⊥ (j ≥ 1)
and that all sub-derivations of dj satisfy GAP, i.e. we consider a deepest
violation of GAP in d1. Note that possibly dj = d1. Since d1 is fully non-
redundant, the GAP violation in dj means that T ∪Φ(dj)∪¬Ψ(dj) MRA ⊥,
namely T ∪ Φ(dj) ∪ ¬Ψ(dj) is directly inconsistent, and no strict subset of
Φ(dj) ∪ ¬Ψ(dj) can be directly inconsistent with T . Let
Φ(dj) = φ
j
1, . . . , φ
j
h, ¬Ψ(dj) = ¬ψj1, . . . ,¬ψjn, for 0 ≤ h < j, 0 ≤ n
where φj1, . . . , φ
j
h is a sub-sequence of H(dj) = φ1, . . . , φj−1. Note that it
cannot be that n = h = 0, since T is classically (and thus directly) consis-
tent. We thus need to consider the following three cases:
Case 1: n = 0, h > 0,
Case 2: n > 0, h > 0, and
Case 3: n > 0, h = 0.
We will see below that the third case boils down to a sub-case of the sec-
ond case. In the treatment of the ﬁrst two cases, we will refer to the sub-
derivation dk in d1 that is the deepest ancestor sub-derivation of dj such
15We are not addressing here the issue of constructing fully non-redundant derivations,
or what the computational complexity of determining fully non-redundant derivations may
be. We leave these and other computational issues for future work.
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that its hypothesis φk is in Φ(dj). (Note that 1 ≤ k < j in these two cases).
Thus, Φ(dj) = {φk} ∪ Φ′(dj), with all hypotheses in Φ′(dj) ancestors of φk
(namely Φ′(dj) ⊆ H(dk)). In particular, this means that φjh = φk. We will
refer to Φ′(dj) also as Φ′
j .
Below, given a sub-derivation dx = φx : c(Φ(dx)); children(Ψ(dx)) : ⊥
and a child sub-derivation of dx with hypothesis φx+1, Ψ′(dx) stands for
Ψ(dx) without φx+1, (namely, in the set-theoretic presentation, Ψ(dx) =
Ψ′(dx) ∪ {φx+1}). Moreover, Φ(dx) and Ψ(dx) are sometimes indicated as
Φx and Ψx respectively.
A.2.1. Case 1. In this case, dj is a leaf sub-derivation and {φj1, . . . , φjh} is
(minimally) directly inconsistent with T . Moreover, since φk is the deepest
hypothesis amongst φj1, . . . , φ
j
h and φ
j
h = φk, all hypotheses in φ
j
1, . . . , φ
j
h−1
are ancestors of dk and thus we can construct the sub-derivation d′1 of ¬φ1
by replacing in d1 the entire sub-derivation dk of ¬φk (including its sub-
derivations) by a new sub-derivation d′k of ¬φk:16
d′k = φk : c(φj1), . . . , c(φjh−1);− : ⊥
This d′k satisﬁes GAP as the GAP violating set {φj1, . . . , φjh} in dj is a
minimally inconsistent set (namely φk = φ
j
h in this set is needed to derive
the inconsistency). Then d′1 is simpler than d1 as d
′
k satisﬁes GAP whereas
the sub-derivation dk violates GAP as it contains the sub-derivation dj .
A.2.2 Case 2. We consider two sub-cases:
Sub-case 2.1: there are no copies of any of the hypotheses φk+1, . . . , φj in any
of the sub-derivations children(dj) = children(ψ
j
1, . . . , ψ
j
n);
Sub-case 2.2: such copies exist.
Sub-case 2.1: d1 is outlined in Figure 6. Similarly to Case 1, we can construct
the sub-derivation d′1 of ¬φ1 by replacing in d1 the entire sub-derivation dk
of ¬φk by a new sub-derivation d′k of ¬φk:
d′k = φk : c(φj1), . . . , c(φjh−1); children(ψj1, . . . , ψjn) : ⊥
This satisﬁes GAP as the GAP violating set {φj1, . . . , φjh}∪{ψj1, . . . , ψjn} in dj
is a minimally inconsistent set (namely φk = φ
j
h in this set is needed to derive
16 Here and in the remainder of the proof, we omit to give sub-derivations explicitly
and use their denotation instead. Trivially, since T ∪ {φj0, . . . , φjh−1, φk} MRA ⊥, this d′k
can be constructed.
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d1 :
φ1
. . . dk :
φk dk+1 :
φk+1
. . . dj :
φj
... c(φk)
c(Φ′(dj))
...
Ψj
...
...
...
...
⊥
... ¬Ψj
...
... ⊥
Ψ′j−1
...
...
⊥
. . .
⊥
... ¬φk+1
Ψ′k
...
⊥
¬Ψ′k
⊥
Ψ′k−1
...
⊥
. . .
⊥
Figure 6. A sub-derivation d1 with a GAP violation in the sub-derivation
dj where (i) no sub-derivation of dj contains a GAP violation and (ii)
the violation necessarily involves copies of ancestor hypotheses of dj but
no copies of φk+1, . . . , φj are used in the children of dj (Sub-case 2.1
in the Proof of Lemma 6). The hypothesis φk is the deepest ancestor
hypothesis of dj contributing to the GAP violation in dj
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the inconsistency). Then d′1 is simpler than d1 as d
′
k satisﬁes GAP whereas
the sub-derivation dk violates GAP as it contains the sub-derivation dj .
Sub-case 2.2: copies of some of the hypotheses φk+1, . . . , φj exist in the
children(ψj1, . . . , ψ
j
n) sub-derivations of dj . For this sub-case, d1 is outlined
in Figure 7. Given this situation we consider the hypothesis φi which is
the deepest ancestor hypothesis of dj amongst φk+1, . . . , φj that is copied
in any of the sub-derivations of dj . We then consider the sub-derivation
dm which is the ﬁrst such sub-derivation of dj where a copy of φi appears
(note that a copy of φi may also appear in the sibling sub-derivations of dm,
Ψ′m−1 . . .⊥, at their top level). (Note that m > j and k + 1 ≤ i ≤ j.)
The sub-derivation dm (up to the GAP violating sub-derivation dj) is of the
form (see also Figure 7)
dm = φm : c(Φ(dm));¬Ψm : ⊥ = φm : c({φi} ∪ Φ′m);¬Ψm : ⊥
where Φ′m = Φ(dm)\{φi}. The ancestor sub-derivations of dm (up to the
GAP violating sub-derivation dj) and their hypotheses are dm−1, . . . , dj+1, dj
and φm−1, . . . , φj+1, φj , respectively, where ¬φj+1 is part of the GAP vio-
lating set of dj .
We will construct d′1 simpler than d1 by replacing di with a new sub-
derivation d′i of ¬φi. This d′i will be obtained from dm by (I) moving its copy
of φi as the hypothesis of d′i, (II) introducing a new child sub-derivation (of
d′i) of ¬¬φm to obtain φm in d′i, (III) introducing a new child sub-derivation
(of d′i) of ¬¬φ∗, for each φ∗ ∈ {φj+1, . . . , φm−1} ∩ Φ′m, namely for each
φ∗ amongst φj+1, . . . , φm−1 that is copied in dm, and (IV) similarly replac-
ing each copy of a hypothesis φ∗ amongst φj+1, . . . , φm in children(dm)
with a new sub-derivation of ¬¬φ∗. Overall, d′i can be characterised
as:
d′i = φi : c(Φ′m\{φj+1, . . . , φm−1});
{¬¬φm} ∪ (¬¬Φ′m ∩ {¬¬φj+1, . . . ,¬¬φm−1}) ∪ ¬Ψm : ⊥
We will refer to step (I) as ﬂipping of dm on c(φi), denoted fl(dm, c(φi)); to
the new sub-derivation at step (II) as vd(¬φm); to the sub-derivations at step
(III) overall as vd(¬Φ′′m), with Φ′′m = Φ′m ∩ {φj+1, . . . , φm−1}; and to the
sub-derivations obtained from step (IV) as r− children(dm): these stand
for children(dm) where each copy of a hypothesis φ∗ amongst φj+1, . . . , φm
is replaced by a new sub-derivation vd(¬φ∗) to obtain φ∗. Note that, because
of the way φi has been selected, Φ′
m does not contain any hypotheses from
{φi+1, . . . , φj}. Given these notations, the new sub-derivation d′i that we
want to construct can be represented as:
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d1 :
φ1
. . . dk:
φk
. . . di:
φi
. . . dj :
φj dj+1:
φj+1
... . . . dm−1:
c(φk) φm−1
c(Φ′(dj))
... dm:
φm
c(Φ(dm−1)) c(φi)
... c(Φ′(dm))
Ψm
...
...
...
...
⊥
¬Ψm
⊥
...
... ¬φm
Ψ′m−1
...
... ⊥
...
...
... ¬Ψ′m−1
⊥
Ψ′m−2
...
...
... ⊥
. . .
⊥
¬φj+1
...
... Ψ′j
...
⊥
¬Ψ′j
⊥
...
Ψ′j−1
...
. . . ⊥
. . . ⊥
. . . ⊥
⊥
Figure 7. A sub-derivation d1 with a GAP violation in dj and where
no sub-derivation of dj violates GAP. The hypothesis φk is the deepest
ancestor hypothesis of dj contributing to the GAP violation in dj . The
hypothesis φi is the deepest ancestor hypothesis of dj copied in the sub-
derivations of dj , with dm the first such sub-derivation (Sub-case 2.2 in
the Proof of Lemma 6)
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d′i = fl(dm, c(φi)):
φi
c(Φ′m \ Φ′′m)
...
vd(¬φm):
¬φm
...
⊥
φm
...
vd(¬Φ′′m):
¬Φ′′m
...
⊥
Φ′′m
...
r − children(dm):
Ψm
...
⊥
¬Ψm
...
⊥
Figure 8. Derivation d′i = fl(dm, c(φi)) constructed by flipping dm on its
copy of φi
d′i = φi : c(Φ′m\{φj+1, . . . , φm−1});
vd(¬φm), vd(¬Φ′′m), r− children(dm) : ⊥
This sub-derivation d′i can be outlined as in Figure 8.
In order to fully deﬁne d′i, we need to deﬁne vd(¬φm), vd(¬Φ′′m) and all
vd(¬φ∗) for r− children(dm). In order to do this, it suﬃces to deﬁne the
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sub-derivations vd(¬φx) for each x = j + 1, . . . ,m. Also we need to ensure
that these new sub-derivations do not contain any copies of ¬φx for each
x = j + 1, . . . ,m so that they will be legitimate sub-derivations of d′i when
this replaces di in d1.
The construction of these new sub-derivations vd(¬φx) will be based on
the GAP violation in dj from which we will obtain the ﬁrst such new sub-
derivation vd(¬φj+1), then building the rest recursively from this. Hence,
for x = j + 1, the sub-derivation vd(¬φj+1) is obtained from (the GAP
violating) dj as vd(dj ,¬φj+1) deﬁned as follows:
Definition 9. Given dj = φj : c({φk} ∪ Φ′(dj)); {¬φj+1} ∪ ¬Ψ′j : ⊥
(see Figure 7), the sub-derivation vd(dj ,¬φj+1) is ¬φj+1 : c({φk} ∪
Φ′(dj));¬Ψ′j : ⊥.
Since dj is GAP violating trivially T ∪ {φk} ∪ Φ′(dj) ∪ {¬φj+1} ∪
¬Ψ′j MRA ⊥. Moreover, the sub-derivations of ¬Ψ′j contain no copies
of φj+1, . . . φm since they contain no copies of φj+2, . . . φm (as copies are
from ancestors only) and they contain no copies of φj+1 (because these sub-
derivations are siblings of dj+1). Also, these sub-derivations do not contain
any copies of φl for l = i + 1, . . . , j (by the choice of i). Note also that all
hypotheses in {φk} ∪ Φ′(dj) that are copies in this new sub-derivation are
ancestor hypotheses of φi (since i ≥ k + 1 and all hypotheses in Φ′(dj) are
ancestor hypotheses of φk since by construction φk is the deepest hypothesis
copied in dj). As a consequence, vd(¬φj+1) = vd(dj ,¬φj+1) is a legitimate
sub-derivation of d′i when d
′
i replaces di in d1 to give d
′
1. Moreover, vd(¬φj+1)
fully satisﬁes GAP as the children sub-derivations of ¬Ψ′j fully satisfy GAP
(by the way that dj is chosen) and its root sub-derivation satisﬁes GAP due
to the non-redundancy of dj .
For any x > j + 1 (and x ≤ m), we will construct recursively, using
vd(¬φj+1) as a base case, new sub-derivations vd(¬φx) from the sub-
derivations dx−1. Let
dx−1 = φx−1 : c(Φ(dx−1)); {¬φx} ∪ ¬Ψ′x−1 : ⊥
be a descendant sub-derivation of dj+1 (see Figure 7). Let
Φx−1∗ = {φj+1, . . . , φx−2} ∩ Φ(dx−1),
i.e. Φx−1∗ consists of the ancestor hypotheses of dx−1 amongst {φj+1, . . . , φm}
that are copied in dx−1. Note that the set Φ(dx−1)\Φx−1∗ contains only ances-
tor hypotheses {φ1, . . . , φi} (due to the choice of the hypothesis φi as the
deepest ancestor hypothesis of dj that is copied in the children of dj). Note
also that children(dx−1,¬Ψx−1) may only contain copies of φj+1, . . . φx−1
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amongst {φj+1, . . . , φm} (and possibly copies of {φ1, . . . , φi}). Then vd(¬φx)
is obtained by ﬂipping dx−1 on ¬φx, giving fl(dx−1,¬φx) as follows:
Definition 10. Given dx−1 = φx−1 : c(Φ(dx−1)); {¬φx} ∪ ¬Ψ′x−1 : ⊥
(for j + 2 ≤ x ≤ m, see Figure 7), the sub-derivation
fl(dx−1,¬φx) = d′x−1 = ¬φx : c(Φ(dx−1)\Φx−1∗ );
{¬¬φx−1} ∪ Φx−1∗ ∪ ¬Ψ′x−1 : ⊥
is such that child(d′x−1,¬¬φx−1), children(d′x−1,Φx−1∗ ), children(d′x−1,
¬Ψx−1) are deﬁned recursively as follows:
• child(d′x−1,¬¬φx−1) =
{
vd(dj ,¬φj+1) (see Deﬁnition 9) if x=j+2
fl(dx−2,¬φx−1) if x > j + 2
• children(d′x−1,Φx−1∗ ) consists of all sub-derivations fl(dl,¬φl) for φl ∈
Φx−1∗ for j + 2 ≤ l ≤ x − 2 and the sub-derivation vd(dj ,¬φj+1) (see
Deﬁnition 9) if φj+1 ∈ Φx−1∗ ;
• children(d′x−1,¬Ψ′x−1) is children(dx−1,¬Ψx−1) without dx and with
each copy of φj+1 replaced by a new sub-derivation vd(dj ,¬φj+1) (see
Deﬁnition 9) and each copy of φl for j +2 ≤ l ≤ x− 1 replaced by a new
sub-derivation fl(dl,¬φl).
From these two Deﬁnitions 9 and 10 we get a set of new sub-derivations,
vd(dj ,¬φj+1), d′j+1, . . . , d′m−1 of ¬¬φj+1,¬¬φj+2, . . . ,¬¬φm respectively.
We then set in the new sub-derivation d′i that we are constructing:
• vd(¬φm) =
{
vd(dj ,¬φj+1) if m = j + 1;
fl(dm−1,¬φm) if m > j + 1;
• each element vd(¬φl) in vd(¬Φ′′m) to vd(dj ,¬φj+1) when l = j + 1 and
to fl(dl,¬φl+1) for any l > j + 1
• r− children(dm) to children(dm) where any copy of φj+1 is replaced
by a new sub-derivation vd(dj ,¬φj+1) and any copy of φl where l =
j + 2, . . . ,m is replaced by a new sub-derivation fl(dl,¬φl).
We then replace di by d′i to give the new derivation d
′
1.
By construction, the new sub-derivation d′i does not contain any copies
of the hypotheses φj+1, . . . , φm of the sub-derivation d1 as any such copy
has been replaced by new sub-derivations vd(dj ,¬φj+1),fl(d′j+1,¬φj+2), . . . ,
fl(d′m−1,¬φm), respectively. Also due to the particular choice of φi and
the way that d′i is constructed this can contain only copies of hypotheses
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φ1, . . . , φi out of the φ1, . . . , φm in d1. Hence d′i thus obtained is a legitimate
sub-derivation of d′1.
Moreover, d′i fully satisﬁes GAP as this is constructed using sub-
derivations of dj which already satisfy GAP (by the way that dj is cho-
sen) and the two operations of ﬂipping and replacement of copies by new
sub-derivations are GAP preserving operations. For the ﬂipping operation
this is because of the non-redundancy property of (sub-)derivations. For the
replacement operation this holds trivially as the deﬁnition of GAP does not
distinguish between copies of ancestor hypotheses and hypotheses derived
by children sub-derivations. Finally, the only sub-derivation used in the con-
struction of d′i that is not obtained from a descendant sub-derivation by using
these operations is the sub-derivation vd(dj ,¬φj+1) given in Deﬁnition 9,
and we have shown earlier that this also satisﬁes GAP. Thus, d′1 is simpler
than d1, as required.
A.2.3. Case 3. In this case, where h = 0, i.e. the GAP violation in dj does
not involve any copies of ancestor hypotheses but comes alone from the
hypotheses, ¬ψj1, . . . ,¬ψjn, of the children sub-derivations of dj , is covered
analogously as Sub-case 2.2, with k = 0. Indeed, in this special case there
must exist at least one copy of a hypothesis from φ1, . . . , φj in the children
sub-derivations of dj or their descendants, as, otherwise, these children sub-
derivations would also constitute root sub-derivations in T and so by the
soundness of Natural Deduction T  ¬ψjx for each x = 1, . . . , n would hold.
But then T ∪ {¬ψj1, . . . ,¬ψjn} MRA ⊥ would mean that T is classically
inconsistent.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We will use the following lemma:
Lemma 7. For any theory T and for any set of sentences Δ such that T ∪Δ
is directly consistent , if NACCT ({φ},Δ) holds then there exists a RAND
derivation of the complement φ of φ from T ∪ Δ.
Proof of lemma 7. We use induction on the number of iterations of the
NT operator whose least ﬁxed point deﬁnes NACCT (see Deﬁnition 3).
Base Case: NACCT ({φ},Δ) holds at the ﬁrst iteration of NT . Then, there
exists A such that A attacks {φ} (namely T ∪ A ∪ {φ} MRA ⊥) and A ⊆
Δ ∪ {φ}. Thus, T ∪ Δ ∪ {φ} MRA ⊥ and, trivially, there exists a RAND
derivation (with no RAND sub-derivations) of φ from T ∪ Δ.
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Induction Hypothesis: For any ψ, for any E such that T ∪ E is directly
consistent, if NACCT ({ψ}, E) holds after k iterations of NT , then there
exists a RAND derivation of ψ (the complement of ψ) from T ∪ E .
Inductive Step: Assume NACCT ({φ},Δ) holds after k+1 iterations of NT ,
for some Δ such that T ∪Δ is directly consistent. Then there exists A such
that
(i) A attacks {φ} (namely T ∪ A ∪ {φ} MRA ⊥), but A ⊆ Δ ∪ {φ}; and
(ii) for each defence D against A, NACCT (D,Δ ∪ {φ}) holds after k iter-
ations of NT .
Since A ⊆ Δ ∪ {φ}, A = {}. Also, by compactness of MRA (hold-
ing by compactness of ), we can assume that A is ﬁnite. Let A =
{ψ1, . . . , ψn}. Then, Di = {ψi}, for any i = 1, . . . , n, is a defence against
A and hence satisﬁes property (ii) above, i.e. NACCT (Di,Δ ∪ {φ})
holds after k iterations. Note that T ∪Δ∪{φ} is directly consistent, as
otherwise Δ attacks {φ} with respect to T and NACCT ({φ},Δ) would
hold at the ﬁrst iteration.
By the induction hypothesis, there exists a RAND derivation of ψi, for
any i = 1, . . . , n. from T ∪ Δ ∪ {φ}. We can construct a RAND deriva-
tion, d, of φ from T ∪Δ, with root sub-derivation d : φ . . .⊥ using the
RAND derivations of ψi from T ∪Δ∪{φ} as child sub-derivations. Thus,
in the root sub-derivation we can use the formulae ψi, for i = 1, . . . , n,
from each child sub-derivation, and hence, by deﬁnition of the attack
A, the derivation d indeed leads directly to inconsistency from T ∪ Δ.
The resulting d is a RAND of φ from T ∪ Δ as any use of φ in the
sub-derivations of ψi from T ∪Δ∪{φ} can now be replicated using the
copy operation of φ from d.
To prove the theorem, assume now that NACCT ({φ}, {}) holds. Directly
from Lemma 7 with Δ = {}, if T is directly consistent then there is a RAND
derivation d of φ from T .
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We will use the following notation, deﬁnition and lemma:
Notation 2. Given a RAND derivation d from T ∪ Δ, for some Δ ⊆ L,
and a RAND (sub-)derivation d′ of φ (the complement of φ) in d (possibly
d′=d), d′ is denoted by
φ : c(φ1), . . . , c(φk); δ1, . . . , δm;ψ1, . . . , ψl : ⊥
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where k,m, l ≥ 0 and
• φ is the hypothesis of d′;
• {φ1, . . . , φk} is the set of all hypotheses χ of RAND (sub-)derivations d′′
of d such that d′′ is an ancestor of d′ in d and χ is copied in d′;
• {δ1, . . . , δj} is the set of all sentences in Δ which are copied in d′;
• {ψ1, . . . , ψl} is the set of all hypotheses of child RAND sub-derivations
of d′ in d, and, ∀j = 1, . . . , l, ψi is the complement of ψi.
Definition 11. [Extended Genuine Absurdity Property] Let d = φ :
c(φ1), . . . , c(φk); δ1, . . . , δm;ψ1, . . . , ψl : ⊥ be a RAND
(sub-)derivation with respect to T ∪ Δ for some Δ ⊆ L. Then d satisﬁes
the extended genuine absurdity property (with respect to 〈T,Δ〉) if and only
if
T ∪ {φ1, . . . , φk} ∪ {δ1, . . . , δm} ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψl} MRA ⊥.
Moreover, d fully satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity property(with
respect to 〈T,Δ〉) if and only if it satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity
property (with respect to 〈T,Δ〉) and all its sub-derivations fully satisfy the
extended genuine absurdity property (with respect to 〈T,Δ〉).
Lemma 8. For any theory T and for any set of sentences Δ such that T∪Δ is
directly consistent , if there exists a RAND derivation of the complement φ
of a sentence φ from T ∪Δ that fully satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity
property with respect to 〈T,Δ〉, then NACCT ({φ},Δ) holds.
Proof of lemma 7. We prove the lemma by induction on the depth of
(the tree corresponding to) the given RAND derivation d of φ from T ∪
Δ. This depth amounts to the maximum number of nested RAND sub-
derivations of d.
Base Case: d has a root sub-derivation of the form φ : −;− : ⊥ (namely
with no sub-derivations). Then trivially T ∪ Δ ∪ {φ} MRA ⊥ and so Δ
attacks {φ} with respect to T . Thus, by deﬁnition of NACCT , since Δ ⊆
Δ ∪ {φ}, trivially NACCT ({φ},Δ) holds.
Induction Hypothesis: For any ψ ∈ L, for any E such that T ∪ E is directly
consistent, if there exists a RAND derivation of depth k of the complement
ψ of some sentence ψ from T ∪ E that fully satisﬁes the extended genuine
absurdity property with respect to 〈T, E〉, then NACCT ({ψ}, E) holds.
Inductive Step: Let d be a RAND derivation of depth k+1 from T ∪Δ of φ
with a root sub-derivation φ : −; δ1, . . . , δm;ψ1, . . . , ψn : ⊥ (for n ≥ 1,m ≥
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0) that satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity property with respect to
〈T,Δ〉. Let Δ′ = {δ1, . . . , δm}. Then T ∪ Δ′ ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ∪ {φ} MRA ⊥
and thus A = Δ′∪{ψ1, . . . , ψn} attacks {φ} with respect to T . We show that
every possible defence against A with respect to T is not acceptable with
respect to Δ∪{φ} in T . By deﬁnition of defence there are three possibilities:
• D = {} is not a possible defence against A with respect to T because
T ∪A MRA ⊥ since Δ′ ⊆ Δ and the RAND derivation d (from T ∪Δ)
satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity property with respect to 〈T,Δ〉,
i.e. T ∪ Δ ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψn} MRA ⊥.
• D = {ψi} (for any i = 1, . . . , n) is a candidate defence against A with
respect to T .
If ψi = φ then the child sub-derivation of d is a RAND derivation of φ
from T ∪ Δ of depth k that fully satisﬁes the extended genuine absur-
dity property with respect to 〈T,Δ〉 and the induction hypothesis gives
that NACCT ({φ},Δ) holds.
If ψi = φ then we know that there exists a RAND sub-derivation d′
of d of ψi from T ∪ Δ. This d′ is also a RAND derivation of ψi from
T ∪ Δ ∪ {φ} which is of depth at most k.
Let d′ = ψi : X; 	1, . . . , 	h; γ1, . . . , γt : ⊥ where X can be either the
empty sequence (−) or c(φ). d′ satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity
property with respect to 〈T,Δ〉 (since d′ is a sub-derivation of d and d
fully satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity property with respect to
〈T,Δ〉).
Note also that T ∪ Δ ∪ {φ} MRA ⊥ as otherwise we would be in the
base case.
If X = − then d′ is a RAND derivation of ψi from T ∪Δ of depth k that
fully satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity property with respect to
〈T,Δ ∪ {φ}〉 and the induction hypothesis gives that
NACCT ({ψi},Δ∪{φ}) holds, as needed for NACCT ({φ},Δ) to hold.
If X = c(φ), then T ∪ {φ} ∪ {	1, . . . , 	h} ∪ {γ1, . . . , γt} MRA ⊥
since d′ satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity property with respect
to 〈T,Δ〉. We can then construct from d′ a derivation d′′ = ψi :
−; 	1, . . . , 	h, φ; γ1, . . . , γt : ⊥ from T ∪Δ∪ {φ} by replacing each c(φ)
in d′ with a use of φ from the theory T ∪ Δ ∪ {φ}. d′′ is (the root sub-
derivation of) a RAND derivation of ψi with respect to T ∪Δ∪{φ} that
fully satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity property with respect to
〈T,Δ∪{φ}〉. Then, by the induction hypothesis, NACCT ({ψi},Δ∪{φ})
holds as needed for NACCT ({φ},Δ) to hold.
On Argumentation Logic and Propositional Logic 277
• D = {δ}, for δ the complement of any δ ∈ Δ, is also a candidate defence
against A. But NACCT ({δ},Δ∪{φ}) holds trivially as {δ} is attacked
by {δ} which is a subset of Δ.
We have shown that all candidate defences against this constructed
attack A are non-acceptable with respect to Δ ∪ {φ} in T as required
for NACCT ({φ},Δ) to hold.
To prove the theorem, assume now that there exists a RAND derivation of φ
from T that satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity property with respect to
〈T, {}〉. Trivially, the derivation fully satisﬁes the extended genuine absurdity
property with respect to 〈T, {}〉 if and only if it fully satisﬁes the genuine
absurdity property with respect to T . Then, taking Δ = {}, directly from
Lemma 8, if T is directly consistent then NACCT ({φ}, {}) holds.
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